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GDPR encryption requirements: HTTPS, TLS and HSTS

At a glance

EU-19MediumGDPR Art. 32(1)(a); Art. 5(1)(f); CNIL web security guidance

Peeky checks how your site's connection is set up: a move from http to https on every address, a valid TLS identity, TLS 1.2 or newer, nothing loaded or sent over http, and HSTS.

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I need to fix thisI need the rule

The rule

Article 32 of the GDPR is headed security of processing. It’s risk-based and names no technology. The wording below is from the Official Journal text, read at the Publications Office mirror.

Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate: (a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data.

So the measures follow the risk. A sign-in page that shows invoices is held to more than a brochure page, and “state of the art” moves on over time.

The article doesn’t mention HTTPS, TLS versions or HSTS. Those come from the regulators.

The CNIL’s web security page asks organisations to “mettre en œuvre le protocole TLS sur tous les sites web, en utilisant uniquement les versions les plus récentes”, and to make it mandatory on pages that handle authentication or personal data. Its 2020 sheet on securing websites asks for TLS 1.2 or 1.3 on every page, and mentions HSTS as a way to force HTTPS for authentication cookies.

Penalties sit in two tiers. Article 83(4)(a) puts the controller’s and processor’s obligations under Articles 25 to 39, Article 32 among them, in the lower tier: up to 10 million euros or 2% of worldwide annual turnover. Authorities often cite Article 32 together with Article 5(1)(f), the integrity and confidentiality principle, which sits in the upper tier.

What PeekWell checks and how

EU-19 asks one question: does every visit to your site travel over a properly set up encrypted connection? It looks at what your servers show anyone, and nothing else.

The scan is automated. It fails if any of these turns up on the addresses it visited:

  • an address that answers on plain http without a permanent move to https, including the www and bare-domain versions and any language addresses
  • a TLS identity that has expired, doesn’t match the address or can’t be traced to a trusted issuer
  • a connection older than TLS 1.2
  • a page on HTTPS that loads scripts, frames or other active content over plain http
  • a form that sends what people type to an http address
  • no HSTS header

The first five are about how data travels between a visitor and your server, which is what the decisions below turned on. HSTS rests on guidance alone. The CNIL’s 2020 sheet mentions it, and no decision read for this article fines a site for leaving it out. It’s in the list because it’s the setting that keeps browsers on HTTPS once they’ve found it.

Images or video pulled in over http are left out. The report has one line for each address it checked, saying what it found there.

The scan has limits, and the report says so. It reads the connection setup of the public addresses it visited and nothing more. It doesn’t port-scan, try to get in where it isn’t allowed, run any security test or open addresses nobody linked to. It can’t see how data is stored or what happens on a server after a form is sent. A Passed means the expected setup was seen on the addresses scanned. It doesn’t say the site complies.

The browser protections a server sends with each page, such as Content-Security-Policy, are a separate check, EU-15. UK-17 and US-16 ask this question under British and American law.

Why it matters for a company

These cases are about the plainest of measures: whether data goes over the wire in the clear.

In October 2022 the Garante decided a complaint about a water utility. Users signed in to a customer area, where they saw names, tax codes, contact details and invoices for about 13,000 registered users, including over 2,000 businesses. The area ran over http. The Garante wrote that failing to use cryptographic techniques for the transport of data amounts to an infringement of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32, and that the company should have used a secure protocol “quale il protocollo https” from the design stage. It set the fine at 15,000 euros, counting the number of users and the fact that the company hadn’t acted after the complainant raised the problem twice.

An expired TLS identity is enough to start a case. The AEPD opened one against the town council of Pioz after a complaint that its e-government site showed a “not secure” warning. The identity had run out on 5 April 2020, so what users typed travelled unencrypted. A valid one went in on 5 February 2026, and the AEPD closed the case.

The CNIL has also written to organisations about transport alone. Its 2023 report records 39 formal notices to public bodies, such as regions and municipalities, whose sites didn’t use HTTPS. Its March 2024 note on simplified sanctions describes fines for organisations that kept TLS 1.0 or 1.1, and the SHA-1 hash function, after a formal notice. The note doesn’t name them.

These facts are visible from outside, so an authority needs no inside access to notice them. In most of the matters above a complaint came first. The Garante also counted it against the utility that it had ignored two warnings.

Smaller companies and larger companies

Article 32 has no size threshold, but it’s risk-based, so the same gap weighs differently depending on what the site carries.

In a small company the site usually sits on a hosted builder or a managed plan, which switches on HTTPS for the main address. The gaps appear at the edges. An old shop address still answers on http. A TLS identity expires because the renewal was tied to one person’s card or inbox. The Spanish authority fined an online seller of number plates 1,000 euros under Article 32 because its order form, which asked for scans of ID cards, ran over http. Brav, which supplied the platform a city’s local police used for traffic fines, ran it over https. The Garante still fined it 10,000 euros, in part because the same platform could be used over plain http too.

In a larger company the same problems multiply. There are dozens of hostnames, campaign microsites built by agencies and legacy portals. TLS settings differ between the main site and the customer area, which is the pattern in the water-utility decision: the public front looks fine and the sign-in area behind it doesn’t.

Enforcement cases

Published decisions about other companies, listed for context. Each links to the authority's own page. They say nothing about any particular website.

The Officer, squinting at a file.

Larger companies

  • Servizio Idrico Integrato S.c.p.a.

    Garante (Italy), 2022€15,000

    After a complaint, the Garante found that the company's customer area, where users signed in and saw names, tax codes, contact details and invoices for about 13,000 registered users, ran over unencrypted http. It found infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 25(1) and 32, and recorded that the complainant had raised the problem with the company twice and that the company had not acted before the Garante opened its inquiry.

    Read the Garante (Italy) publication about Servizio Idrico Integrato S.c.p.a.
  • Aeroporto Guglielmo Marconi di Bologna S.p.A.

    Garante (Italy), 2021€40,000

    During inspections of whistleblowing tools, the Garante found that the airport's reporting application, open on the internet, carried reports over http rather than a secure protocol such as https, and stored them unencrypted. It did not accept that the small number of reports made these measures unnecessary, and found infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 25 and 32.

    Read the Garante (Italy) publication about Aeroporto Guglielmo Marconi di Bologna S.p.A.
  • Health information website publisher (CNIL SAN-2023-006)

    CNIL (France), 2023€380,000 in total, covering several findings

    The CNIL found that the pages of the site's online tests, where users entered personal data including health data, used plain http by default until October 2019. It held that the lack of https, a basic security measure, or of an equivalent measure was an infringement of Article 32. The total also covered findings on retention, health data, joint control and cookies.

    Read the CNIL (France) publication about Health information website publisher (CNIL SAN-2023-006)

Smaller companies

  • Ayuntamiento de Pioz

    AEPD (Spain), 2026No fine; case closed after the fix

    After a complaint that the town council's e-government site showed a warning that the page was not secure, the AEPD found that the site's TLS identity had expired on 5 April 2020, so data that users entered travelled over the internet without encryption. The council did not answer the AEPD's requests. A valid TLS identity was in place from 5 February 2026, and the AEPD then closed the case without corrective measures.

    Read the AEPD (Spain) publication about Ayuntamiento de Pioz
  • Brav s.r.l.

    Garante (Italy), 2022€10,000

    Brav supplied the platform a city's local police used to manage traffic fines. The Garante found that, although the platform ran over https, it could still be used over plain http, a protocol that protects neither the confidentiality and integrity of the data nor the authenticity of the site, and that users were not made to change weak first passwords. It found infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32.

    Read the Garante (Italy) publication about Brav s.r.l.
  • Asociación Jerez Capital

    AEPD (Spain), 2021No fine under Art. 32; warning (€1,000 for cookies)

    After a complaint, the AEPD found that the association's jobs portal ran over http, so the browser warned visitors that it was not secure, while its sign-up and contact forms collected names, email addresses and phone numbers. It issued a warning under Article 32(1) and ordered the association to put in place security measures appropriate to the risk.

    Read the AEPD (Spain) publication about Asociación Jerez Capital
  • Miguel Ibáñez Bezanilla S.L.

    AEPD (Spain), 2020€1,000 under Art. 32 (€3,000 in total)

    After a complaint, the AEPD found that the company's online shop for vehicle number plates collected names, ID numbers, vehicle details and scans of ID cards and registration papers over plain http, so the data was not sent encrypted. It fined the company 1,000 euros under Article 32, alongside separate fines for its privacy notice and cookies, and ordered it to set up secure transmission.

    Read the AEPD (Spain) publication about Miguel Ibáñez Bezanilla S.L.

How to fix it

The order below follows the CNIL’s guidance: TLS on all pages, only recent versions, and HSTS to force the encrypted version.

  1. List every hostname. Write down the main domain, www, the shop, the customer area, the blog and any subdomain your site links to. Check each one in a private window. Include the ones an agency built.
  2. Redirect http to https everywhere. Use a permanent redirect on every hostname, and send it to the same host, not through a third-party address.
  3. Allow only TLS 1.2 and 1.3. Switch off older versions and weak ciphers in the server, load balancer or CDN settings.
  4. Automate renewal and watch the dates. Set the TLS identity to renew by itself and send expiry warnings to a shared mailbox, not a person.
  5. Fix active mixed content and form addresses. Search templates, the database and the page builder for http:// links to scripts and frames, and for forms that post to http://. Change them to https:// or to relative paths.
  6. Add HSTS, then raise it. Start with a short max-age, check nothing breaks, then extend it. Add includeSubDomains only once every subdomain answers over HTTPS.
  7. Re-scan. Run a scan again and check the line for each address shows no gap.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name example.com www.example.com;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}
# inside the HTTPS server block
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=86400" always;

The snippet is a starting point. Whether it’s enough for the data your site handles is a question for your adviser, and Peeky reports only what it sees.

Questions

What are the GDPR encryption requirements for a website?

Article 32 asks for security that fits the risk, and names encryption as one measure to use "as appropriate". It doesn't say HTTPS. Regulators fill that in: the CNIL asks for TLS on every page and recent versions only, and the Garante and the AEPD have fined sites that sent personal data over plain http.

The rule has the wording.

Does the GDPR require encryption in transit?

Not in so many words. Article 32(1) lists "the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data" among measures to take "as appropriate". In its 2022 decision on a water utility, the Garante treated a sign-in area with no encryption in transit as an infringement, and the AEPD fined a shop whose order form sent ID scans over http.

Is http instead of https a GDPR problem?

It is when the page carries personal data. The Garante fined a company 15,000 euros because users signed in and handled their data over http, and the CNIL found that test pages collecting health data on http by default were an infringement. EU-19 fails any address that stays on http instead of moving you to https.

What is an HSTS header and why do regulators mention it?

HSTS is a header that tells a browser to use the encrypted version of your site every time, even when someone types http. The CNIL's 2020 sheet mentions it as a way to force HTTPS for sign-in cookies.

No decision read for this article fines a site for leaving it out. EU-19 still fails without it, because it's the setting that keeps visitors on HTTPS.

Is TLS 1.0 or 1.1 still acceptable?

Not on the CNIL's reading. Its 2020 sheet asks for TLS 1.2 or 1.3, and its March 2024 note on simplified sanctions describes fines for organisations that kept TLS 1.0 or 1.1 after a formal notice. A connection older than TLS 1.2 fails EU-19.

Filed with

The rule

GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679), Arts. 5(1)(f), 32 and 83(4)

Read the rule (GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679), Arts. 5(1)(f), 32 and 83(4))

A case

Ayuntamiento de Pioz

AEPD (Spain), 2026

Read the decision (Ayuntamiento de Pioz)

Your site

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Sources

The law

  1. GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679), Arts. 5(1)(f), 32 and 83(4), on EUR-Lex
  2. GDPR, Official Journal text at the Publications Office
  3. legislation.gov.uk, UK GDPR Art. 83 (retained text, same numbering as the EU original)

Guidance

  1. CNIL, Sécuriser les sites web, page dated 14 March 2024
  2. CNIL, Sheet no. 6: Secure your websites, applications and servers, 11 June 2020
  3. CNIL, Guide de la sécurité des données personnelles (25 sheets, including Sécuriser les sites web)
  4. ANSSI, Recommandations de sécurité relatives à TLS, 26 March 2020
  5. BSI, TR-02102-2: Cryptographic Mechanisms, Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 2026-01
  6. CNIL, Sécurité des sites web : les 5 problèmes les plus souvent constatés, 27 June 2018

Decisions and cases

  1. Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Ordinanza ingiunzione nei confronti di Servizio Idrico Integrato S.c.p.a., 6 October 2022 [doc. web 9817058]
  2. AEPD, Resolución de procedimiento sancionador PS/00185/2020 (Miguel Ibáñez Bezanilla S.L.), 26 October 2020
  3. AEPD, Resolución de procedimiento sancionador PS/00430/2021 (Asociación Jerez Capital)
  4. Garante, Ordinanza ingiunzione nei confronti di Aeroporto Guglielmo Marconi di Bologna S.p.a., 10 June 2021 [doc. web 9685922]
  5. Garante, Ordinanza ingiunzione nei confronti di aiComply S.r.l., 10 June 2021 [doc. web 9685947] (whistleblowing app supplier, same http finding)
  6. CNIL, Deliberation SAN-2023-006 of 11 May 2023, on Legifrance
  7. CNIL, Fifteen new sanctions under the simplified procedure since January 2024, 12 March 2024
  8. Garante, Ordinanza ingiunzione nei confronti di Brav s.r.l., 24 March 2022 [doc. web 9767635]
  9. AEPD, Resolución de archivo de actuaciones AI/00344/2025 (Ayuntamiento de Pioz), expediente EXP202501984
  10. Garante, Ordinanza ingiunzione nei confronti di Società Med Store Saronno s.r.l., 2 December 2021 [doc. web 9734934] (clinic's radiology viewer reachable over http)

Further reading

  1. Garante, Newsletter of 24 October 2022 on secure protocols for online services [doc. web 9817079]
  2. CNIL, Sanctions et mesures correctrices : le bilan 2023, page dated 16 February 2024 (39 formal notices on HTTPS)
  3. CNIL, Quelles sanctions peuvent être prononcées par la CNIL

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For information only. Not legal advice.